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“Statement Before the
Senate Committee on Armed
Services
Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity
“Department of
Defense’s role in Protecting
Democratic Elections”
A Testimony by:
Heather A. Conley
Senior Vice President for
Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, and Director, Europe Program CSIS
February 13, 2018
I am a professional
outlier on this panel for I am not a cyber security expert, but I
have spent the last several years at CSIS studying and understanding
how malign Russian influence works in Europe, which we have described
in detail in our seminal report, The Kremlin Playbook.
We have
studied in detail how Russian economic influence has worked in five
European countries (Latvia, Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Serbia)
over a ten-year period to understand how Russia infiltrates a
democracy and erodes confidence and credibility in how that democracy
works.
... Russian influence has
fomented societal unrest and altered Western-oriented government
policies.
Having said this, I
believe Russian influence is less about physical cyber security
(although cyberattacks are a useful tool) and more about
(dis)information and influence superiority, which is how the Kremlin
believes it will maintain its global preeminence as it addresses slow
and longterm decline.
According to the Czech Security Information
Service, it is the Kremlin’s goal to convince the average citizen
that “everyone is lying,” which in turn will “weaken society’s
will to resist” Russian interests.
Therefore, one of our
first lines of defense is to develop a much deeper understanding of
and a body of research into how Russia practices its influence
operations as well as to study how European countries defend
themselves against these ongoing operations ...
Our
defense and intelligence officials must have the closest possible
relationship with our European partners to develop effective and
sustainable countermeasures against Russian influence.
Secondly, it needs to be
understood that Russian influence does not simply occur in and around
a national election; it is a continuous and holistic series of
operations that are designed to break the “internal coherence of
the enemy system.”
It is true that elections are the most visible
opportunity to harm a democracy when it is at its most vulnerable. We
can observe that Russian influence operations and cyber infiltration
may accelerate approximately two years prior to an election but this
does not mean that Russian operations cease after an election. If
anything, they simply adapt their methods to the outcome and alter
their strategies to continue to degrade confidence in democratic
institutions.
Sustained Russian influence operations focus on those
issues that are deeply divisive within a society, such as issues
related to migration or questions of history or national, racial or
religious identity. Today’s Russian influence operations, just as
their predecessor, Soviet active measures, exploit the weaknesses
that are present within a society but they benefit from increasingly
sophisticated means amid increasingly confused Western societies that
are overwhelmed daily by a growing amount of information.
My contribution to this
important discussion is to offer you what I believe European
countries have done successfully to combat malign Russian influence
and disinformation as well as increase cyber-protection. But before
doing this, I will address the questions posed to all the witnesses
today.
I do not believe the Department of Defense has a leading role
to play in the cyber protection of U.S. elections. This is the
purview of the Department of Homeland Security, which has struggled
to develop effective policies to protect critical election
infrastructure as distrust between the federal government and state
as well as local election officials has grown.
However, I believe the
Department of Defense can play a role that is highly complementary to
the work of the Department of Homeland Security by rebuilding trust
between state and federal officials, and building knowledge and
awareness of the ever-present threat. This will not be easy. State
and local election officials are unable to receive classified
intelligence briefings. Candidates for office may not have received
cybersecurity training or know whom to contact should they become the
victim of illicit hacking or an influence operation.
We can learn from the
French government about how to combine military and civilian efforts
to prevent cyber-destabilization. This month the French Ministry of
Defense released its Military Planning Law, which prioritizes cyber
risks and seeks to increase cooperation with telecommunication
companies to enable them to scan networks for technical clues of
ongoing or future cyberattacks. The civilian French Network and
Information Security Agency (ANSSI) will provide a list of risk
indicators to the Defense Ministry. These risk indicators only focus
on technical aspects of security breaches and not on content (which
is important to ensure First Amendment protections in the United
States).
The goal is to enhance early detection...The strategic
review of France’s cyber defense sets out six main goals:
prevention, anticipation, protection, detection, attribution, and
reaction.5 The ANSSI provides cybersecurity awareness-raising
seminars to politicians and parties. Could DoD produce something
similar in cooperation with DHS?
While there is a role for
the Defense Department to play in deploying offensive cyber
capabilities should there be an attributable Russian attack on the
U.S. election process, it would have to be part of a
whole-of-government policy and strategy toward Russian influence
operations, which at present the United States government does not
have – but urgently needs.
… There are two
additional areas that the Defense Department could explore to enhance
disinformation awareness and cyber-protection prior to the 2018
mid-term and 2020 presidential elections.
First, it could use its
extensive employee and military network to provide timely policy
guidance and statements about the threat that Russian influence
operations pose to election security. Secretary Mattis and General
Dunford should provide extensive public outreach to the defense
community about the nature of the threat and how best to counter it
to sensitize the DoD community to the threat of Russian influence and
misinformation operations in a public service announcement format.
Another idea would be to consider engaging the National Guard Bureau
to help develop and facilitate training of state and local election
officials to enhance cybersecurity awareness and to be able to detect
patterns of influence... in
partnership with the Department of Homeland Security. Those National
Guard units that have participated in the State Partnership Program
(SPP) have served and developed relationships with European partners,
and could also be particularly helpful in sharing information about
Russian influence operations...through
the State Adjutant Generals who are very well regarded among state
and local officials.
... Simply put, the Defense
Department must model the bipartisan and fact-based actions, behavior
and awareness that will reduce societal division and help bridge the
state and federal divide. As one of the most trusted institutions in
the United States, the Defense Department must leverage that trust to
mitigate malign Russian influence.
Turning now to the
European laboratory of Russian cyber-destabilization, there are
several important lessons that the 2017 European election cycle has
taught us (and that Europeans have learned):
Excerpts ~
1
The necessity of having a
paper ballot either as the ballot of record or as a back-up to an
electronic ballot...
2
A unified and
all-political party message on what is at stake as well as how to
detect and understand Russian influence. There was sufficient trust in the
institutions and their leaders to ensure that a majority of the
public took heed of the warning, which reduced the impact of the
Russian misinformation campaign.
3
French and German media
organizations set up fact-checking teams and social media platforms
that cooperated with authorities to protect sensitive accounts...
4
In Sweden, ahead of the
September 2018 elections, the government plans to create a new agency
to enhance the public’s “psychological defense” against
influence by identifying, analyzing and reacting to Russian influence
attempts...
5
Swedish Prime Minister
Löfven plans to convene political parties to share protection and
resilience strategies throughout the election process. The media
would also take part in some of these meetings to bolster awareness
of foreign influence.
6
The chief of Sapo has
increased information-sharing with European partners, and with other
security services to better protect the election process; he argued
that despite being a security service, openness was important to
inform the public on the threat.
7
The Swedish government is
also discussing the inclusion of critical thinking skills in primary
school curricula, teaching children how to spot fake news. Swedish
government authorities have initiated a series of public news
literacy activities to help the Swedish public discern how truthful
and fact-based information that receive.
The U.S. government has
taken none of these positive, proactive steps – to my knowledge.
The most proactive work being done in this space is taking place in
U.S. think-tanks and universities through independent funding.
So perhaps the most
immediate and important step the Department of Defense could take –
in concert with Congress – is to demand a whole-of-government
approach to minimize the impact of Russian influence operations in
the United States.
A disjointed approach by the U.S. government and
the daily undermining of the legitimacy of U.S. intelligence and law
enforcement agencies does the Kremlin’s work far better (and
cheaper) than any Russian influence operation could.”
You can read more detail here
You can watch the 1:22:48 hearing here
which included other witnesses ⬇
( You can see a 2-hour hearing Ms.
Conley participated in before the hearing linked above, chaired by
Sen. Graham titled: "The Modus Operandi and Toolbox of Russia and
Other Autocracies for Undermining Democracies Throughout the World" in
my March 17, 2917 blog which also includes a link to "The Kremlin
Playbook" here
You can also see a brief Conley bio here )
➥ Who I'm following on Twitter this week on the topic of the Russian invasion of our sovereignty to install Trump:
Malcolm Nance
AM Joy w/Joy Reid
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Focused Thought in 1-2 minute
Focused Action in 30 seconds
You can share "Citizens Fed Up" Tweet here
Focused Point of Interest in 2-3 minutes,
3-5 minutes if you choose to read the article in full
"Hillary Clinton, a
favorite GOP foil, plans discreet 2018 strategy" OR, Hillary is not running for President in 2010...
… Her emerging 2018
strategy, according to more than a dozen friends and advisers
familiar with her plans, is to leverage the star power she retains in
some Democratic circles on behalf of select candidates while
remaining sufficiently below the radar to avoid becoming a useful
target for Republicans seeking to rile up their base.
Most likely, they said,
Clinton will attempt to help Democratic candidates...expending her political capital
in a number of the 23 congressional districts she won in
2016 but are now held by a Republican. Lending a hand to Democrats
organizing at a grass-roots level is a priority, they added.
“She’s not going to be
up front,” said Jaime Harrison, a former chairman of the South
Carolina Democratic Party and an associate chairman of the Democratic
National Committee.
Harrison said Clinton told
him in December that she was committed to turning out core blocs in
the party, such as African Americans and Latinos. “She’s saying,
‘Listen, I’m no longer running but we need these groups to be
strong and people to vote.’ ” (Emphasis is mine.)
… A Clinton 2020
campaign has been ruled out...
“No, no, no, no,” one
former Clinton adviser said when asked whether Clinton has privately
floated the idea.
… Clinton...began appearing in public
more often last fall around the release of her campaign memoir, “What
Happened.”
She spoke then about the
need for Democratic supporters to get involved in politics and stand
up to Trump — but she signaled that her own involvement would be
calibrated.
“I am done with being a
candidate,” Clinton said on CBS’s “Sunday Morning” in
September. (Emphasis is mine.)
… Clinton’s primary
political vehicle is a nonprofit organization and affiliated super
PAC called Onward Together, which she created last year and which
directs resources to groups aimed at boosting Democratic candidates
and turnout.
Even that enterprise is
understated. Its website does not feature her picture. Instead, it
lists one of her quotes — “Resist, insist, persist, enlist” —
and invites visitors to get involved in upstart groups she supports,
such as Indivisible and Run for Something.
Federal election filings
show that Clinton’s Hillary for America political committee
transferred $800,000 in May to Onward Together. A person close to the
group called it an “incubator” and said it has given out more
than $1 million over the past year.
“Putting herself out
there isn’t the goal,” said former Vermont governor Howard Dean
(D), who works with Clinton at Onward Together.
“Neither is
thinking about the politics of this or that. What the group focuses
on is helping [Democrats] to mobilize and organize” by providing
funding and advice.
Advisers say Clinton has
made a practice of calling lesser-known Democratic candidates around
the country who are viewed as future stars — a way to provide
encouragement without making a formal endorsement or participating in
splashy events that would indicate her political return.
When Austin Davis won a
state legislative seat in a special election in Pennsylvania last
month, Clinton called with congratulations, and Davis soon after
posted a snapshot of him taking the call.
Atlanta Democrat Nikema
Williams, running last year for a state Senate seat, was invited
backstage with Clinton and they posed together for a picture — an
endorsement in spirit.
“She told me she was
proud of me for stepping up to run for office and was watching my
election,” Williams wrote later to supporters alongside a photo of
their hands clasped. “Like Secretary Clinton, my opponent and
detractors call me the establishment.” Williams ended up winning
the seat.
There have been other
small gestures. Last fall, the Nebraska Democratic Party chairman
asked Clinton to provide signed copies of “What Happened” for a
fundraising auction. She quickly signed the books and sent them to
Lincoln.
Clinton is considering
whether she will make endorsements in coming weeks ...
You can read more here
.
.
.
→ Direct sources for Democrats:
* ( Personal favored and most informative follows are shared here with the understanding that readers will always apply their own critical thinking to any information provided anywhere by anyone. #StrongerTogether does not share sources of information lightly but -- no one is perfect! -- so always #DistrustAndVerify I am using a star rating that is strictly based on my situational experience with the work of the media personality specifically in relation to issues of interest to me. )
The Democratic Party Website
Also
C-SPAN (a good place for speeches & hearings direct source (s))
→ Fact checking organizations courtesy of the Society of Professional Journalists
in alphabetical order...
→ Some of my favorite, most informative
follows on Twitter include:
⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ US Intelligence | Author | Navy Senior Chief | NBC/MSNBC
⭐⭐⭐ Federal Government Operations | Vanity Fair | Newsweek | MSNBC Contributor | Author
⭐⭐⭐⭐ Voting Rights/Voter Suppression | Author | Mother Jones
→ Some of the most credible media -- at the moment:
📰📰📰 Mother Jones
→ Some of the most credible Talking Heads -- at the moment -- and their Twitter handles:
( 📎 Interesting to note: Wallace, a Republican (an inactive Republican I believe she calls herself) s new to the job but for right now she has clearly put country over party and her work on Trump GOP has been credible, IMO... )
...for Networking for Democrats today!
g. (Unapologetic Democrat)
g. (Unapologetic Democrat)
.
.
.
(Linked) "...is our 2016 platform...a declaration of how we plan to move America forward. Democrats believe that cooperation is better than conflict, unity is better than division, empowerment is better than resentment, and bridges are better than walls.
It’s a simple but powerful idea: We are stronger together."
( #its2018now )
*
Curated by Gail Mountain, with occasional personal commentary, Network For #StrongerTogether ! is not affiliated with The Democratic Party in any capacity. This is an independent blog and the hope is you will, at a glance, learn more about the Party and you will, with a click or two, also take action on its behalf as it is provided!
( You can also find me on Twitter at https://twitter.com/GKMTNtwits )
*
See the League of Women Voters website:
Vote411 here
Thank you for focusing!
g., aka Focused Democrat
✊ Resisting "Fake News"
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